For several decades, researchers from different communities have independently focused on protecting confidentiality of data. Two distinct technologies have emerged for such purposes: Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and Information-Flow Control (IFC)-the former belonging to operating systems (OS) research, while the latter to the programming languages community. These approaches restrict how data gets propagated within a system in order to avoid information leaks. In this scenario, Haskell plays a unique privileged role: it is able to protect confidentiality via libraries. This pearl presents a monadic API which statically protects confidentiality even in the presence of advanced features like exceptions, concurrency, and mutable data structures. Additionally, we present a mechanism to safely extend the library with new primitives, where library designers only need to indicate the read and write effects of new operations.
Introduction
Developing techniques to keep secrets is a fascinating topic of research. It often involves a cat and mouse game between the attacker, who provides the code to manipulate someone else's secrets, and the designer of the secure system, who does not want those secrets to be leaked. To give a glimpse of this thrilling game, we present a running example which involves sensitive data, two Haskell programmers, one manager, and a plausible work situation. * 
This malicious code utilizes legit URLs for fetching English and Spanish lists of common passwords. By simply inspecting the interleaves of HTTP requests, Bob can deduce the alphabetic nature of the first two characters of the password. For example, if
Bob sees the sequence of requests for files "dict_en.txt", "dict_sp.txt", and "dict_en.txt", he knows that the first two characters are indeed alphabetic. Importantly, the used URLs do not contain secret information. It is the execution of wget , that depends on secret information, which reveals information. Blacklisting (whitelisting) The example above captures the scenario that this work is considering: as programmers, we want to securely incorporate some code written by outsiders, referred as untrusted code, to handle sensitive data. Protecting secrets is not about blacklisting (or whitelisting) resources, but rather assuring that information flows into appropriated places. In this light, MAC and IFC techniques associate data with security labels to describe its degree of confidentiality. In turn, an enforcement mechanism tracks how data flows within programs to guarantee that secrets are manipulated in such a way that they do not end up in public entities. While pursuing the same goal, MAC and IFC techniques use different approaches to track data and avoid information leaks.
This pearl constructs MAC, one of the simplest libraries for statically protecting confidentiality in untrusted code. In just a few lines, the library recasts MAC ideas into Haskell, and different from other static enforcements (Li & Zdancewic 2006; Tsai et al. 2007; Russo et al. 2008; Devriese & Piessens 2011) , it supports advanced language features like references, exceptions, and concurrency. Similar to (Stefan et al. 2011b) , this work bridges the gap between IFC and MAC techniques by leveraging programming languages concepts to implement MAC-like mechanisms. The design of MAC is inspired by a combination of ideas present in existing Figure 1 . Encoding security lattices in Haskell
Figure 2. The monad MAC ℓ security libraries (Russo et al. 2008; Stefan et al. 2011b) . MAC is not intended to work with off-the-shelf untrusted code, but rather to guide (and force) programmers to build secure software. As anticipated by the title of this pearl, we show that when Bob is obliged to use MAC, and therefore Haskell, his code is forced to keep passwords confidential.
Keeping Secrets
We start by modeling how data is allowed to flow within programs.
Security Lattices
Formally, labels are organized in a security lattice which governs flows of information (Denning & Denning 1977) , i.e., ℓ1 ⊑ ℓ2 dictates that data with label ℓ1 can flow into entities labeled with ℓ2. For simplicity, we use labels H and L to respectively denote secret (high) and public (low) data. Information cannot flow from secret entities into public ones, a policy known as non-interference (Goguen & Meseguer 1982) , i.e., L ⊏ H and H ⊑ L. Figure 1 shows the encoding of this two-point lattice using type classes (Russo et al. 2008) 2 . With a security lattice in place, we proceed to label data produced by computations.
Sensitive Computations
As demonstrated in Example 1, we need to control how IO-actions are executed in order to avoid data leaks. We introduce the monad family MAC responsible for encapsulating IO-actions and restricting their execution to situations where confidentiality is not compromised 3 . The index for this family consists on a security label ℓ indicating the sensitivity of monadic results. For example, MAC L Int represents computations which produce public integers. Figure 2 defines MAC ℓ and its API. We remark that MAC is parametric in the security lattice being used. Constructor MAC TCB 2 Orphan instances could break the security lattice. Readers should refer to the accompanying source code to learn how to avoid that. 
As a natural next step, we proceed to extend MAC ℓ with a richer set of actions, i.e., non-proper morphisms, responsible for producing useful side-effects. Figure 4 . Interaction between MAC ℓ and labeled resources.
Sensitive Sources and Sinks of Data
In general terms, sideeffects in MAC ℓ can be seen as actions which either read or write data. Such actions, however, need to be conceived in a manner that not only respects the sensitivity of the results in MAC ℓ, but the sensitivity of sources and sinks of information. We classify origins and destinations of data by introducing the concept of labeled resources-see Figure 3 4 . The safe interaction between MAC ℓ-actions and labeled resources is shown in Figure 4 . On one hand, if a computation MAC ℓ only reads from labeled resources less sensitive than ℓ (see Figure 4a) , then it has no means to return data more sensitive than that. This restriction, known as no read-up (Bell & La Padula 1976) , protects the confidentiality degree of the result produced by MAC ℓ, i.e., the result only involves data with sensitivity (at most) ℓ. Dually, if a MAC ℓ computation writes data into a sink, the computation should have lower sensitivity than the security label of the sink itself (see Figure 4b ). This restriction, known as no write-down (Bell & La Padula 1976) , respects the sensitivity of the sink, i.e., it never receives data more sensitive than its label. To help readers, we indicate the relationship between type variables in their subindexes, i.e., we use ℓL and ℓH to attest that ℓL ⊑ ℓH.
We take the no read-up and no write-down rules as the core principles upon which our library is built. This decision not only leads to correctness, but also establishes a uniform enforcement mechanism for security. We extend the TCB with functions that lift IO-actions following such rules-see Figure 5 . These functions are part of MAC's internals and are designed to synthesize secure functions (when applied to their first argument). The purpose of using d a instead of a will become evident when extending the library with secure versions of existing data types (e.g., Section 3 Figure 5 . Synthesizing secure functions by mapping read and write effects to security checks
Figure 6. Labeled expressions Function read TCB takes a function of type d a → IO a, which reads a value of type a from a data structure of type d a, and returns a secure function which reads from a labeled data structure, i.e., a function of type Res ℓL (d a) → MAC ℓH a. Similarly, function write TCB takes a function of type d a → IO (), which writes into a data structure of type d a, and returns a secure function which writes into a labeled resource, i.e., a function of type Res ℓH (d a) → MAC ℓL (). Function new TCB takes an IO-action of type IO (d a), which allocates a data structure of type d a, and returns a secure action which allocates a labeled resource, i.e, an action of type MAC ℓL (Res ℓH (d a)). From the security point of view, allocation of data is considered as a write effect; therefore, the signature of function new TCB requires that ℓL ⊑ ℓH. Observe that read TCB , write TCB , and new TCB adhere to the principles of no read-up and no write-down. To illustrate the use of these primitives, Figure 6 exposes the simplest possible labeled resources: Haskell expressions. Data type Id a is used to represent expressions of type a. For simplicity of exposition, we utilize Labeled ℓ a as a type synonym for labeled resources of type Id a. The implementation applies new TCB and read TCB for creating and reading elements of type Labeled ℓ a, respectively.
Joining Family Members
Based on type definitions, computations handling data with heterogeneous labels necessarily involve nested MAC ℓ-or IOactions in its return type. For instance, consider a piece of code m :: MAC L (String, MAC H Int) which handles both public and secret information, and produces a public string and a secret integer as a result. While somehow manageable for a two-point lattice, it becomes intractable for general cases-imagine a computation combining and producing data at many different security levels! To tackle this problem, Figure 7 presents primitive join MAC to safely integrate more sensitive computations into less sensitive ones. Operationally, function join MAC runs the computation of type MAC ℓH a and wraps the result into a labeled expression to protect its sensitivity.
Types indicate us that the integration of effects from monad MAC ℓH does not violate the no read-up and no write-down rules for monad MAC ℓL. At first sight, read effects from monad MAC ℓH could violate the no read-up rule for MAC ℓL, e.g., it is enough for MAC ℓH to read from a resource labeled as ℓ such that ℓL ⊏ ℓ ⊑ ℓH. Nevertheless, data obtained from such reads has no evident effect for monad MAC ℓL. Observe that, by typechecking, sensitive data acquired in MAC ℓH cannot be used to build actions in MAC ℓL. In other words, from the perspective of MAC ℓL, types assure that it is like those read effects have never occurred. With respect to write effects, monad MAC ℓH is allowed to write into labeled resources at sensitivity ℓ such that ℓH ⊑ ℓ. By the type constrain in join MAC and transitivity, it holds that ℓL ⊑ ℓ, which satisfies the no write-down rule for monad MAC ℓL.
Despite 
The code marks the password as sensitive (lpwd), runs Bob's code, and obtains the result (lbool)-since Alice is trustworthy, her
5 e.g., by applying appropriate lifting operations (Swamy et al. 2011) type Ref Figure 8 . Secondly, we consider functions newIORef :: a → IO (IORef a), readIORef :: IORef a → IO a, and writeIORef :: IORef a → a → IO () to create, read, and write references, respectively. Secure versions of such functions must follow the no read-up and no write-down rules. Based on that premise, functions newIORef , readIORef , and writeIORef are lifted into the monad MAC ℓ by wrapping them using new TCB , read TCB , and write TCB , respectively. We remark that these steps naturally generalize to obtain secure interfaces of various kinds. (For instance, Section 6 shows how to add MVar s by applying similar steps.) With secure references available in MAC, Alice is ready to give Bob a chance to implement his memoization function.
EXAMPLE 4. After receiving the new interface, Bob writes a memoization function which works in the monad MAC L.
Bob
We leave the implementation of this function as an exercise for the reader 6 . Bob also generalizes common pwds to be parametric in the function used to fetch URLs. Bob
Finally, Alice puts all the pieces together by initializing the memoized version of wget MAC and pass it to common pwds. 
Handling Errors
It is not desirable that a program crashes (or goes wrong) due to some components not being able to properly report or recover from errors. In Haskell, errors can be administrated by making data structures aware of them, e.g., type Maybe. Pure computations are all that programmers need in this case-a feature already supported by MAC. More interestingly, Haskell allows throwing exceptions Figure 9 . Secure exceptions anywhere, but only catching them within the IO monad. To extend MAC with such a system, we need to lift exceptions and their operations to securely work in monad MAC ℓ. Figure 9 shows functions throw MAC and catch MAC to throw and catch secure exceptions, respectively. Exceptions can be thrown anywhere within the monad MAC ℓ. We note that exceptions are caught in the same family member where they are thrown. As shown in (Stefan et al. 2012b; Hritcu et al. 2013) , exceptions can compromise security if they propagate to a context-in our case, another family member-different from where they are thrown.
The interaction between join MAC and exceptions is quite subtle. As the next example shows, their interaction might lead to compromised security. Figure 9 .
EXAMPLE 5. Alice extends MAC with the primitives in

Tired of dealing with Bob, she asks Charlie to tell him to adapt his code to recover from failures in wget MAC . Unexpectedly, Bob takes the news from Charlie in a positive manner. He knows that new features in the library might bring new opportunities to ruin Alice's project (unfortunately, he is right). First, Bob adapts his code to recover from network errors.
Bob common pwds wget lpwd = catch MAC (Ex4 .common pwds wget lpwd) (λ(e :: SomeException ) → label True > > = return)
Function Ex4 .common pwds implements the check for common password as shown in Example 4. For simplicity, and to be conservative, the code classifies any password as common when the network is down (label True).
Bob realizes that, depending on a secret value, an exception raised within a join MAC block could stop the production of a subsequent public event. 
He further extends his code to decompose characters into bytes and strings into characters.
We leave the implementation of these functions as exercises for the interested readers. Finally, Bob implements the code for leaking passwords as follows. Bob
common pwds wget lpwd = attack lpwd > > Ex4 .common pwds wget lpwd
The reason for the attack is the use of MAC ℓH-actions which can suppress subsequent MAC ℓL-actions by simply throwing exceptions (see join MAC in function crashOnTrue ). As the attack shows, exceptions can be thrown at inner family members and propagate to less sensitive ones-effectively establishing a communication channel which violates the security lattice. Unfortunately, types are of little help here: on one hand, join MAC camouflages (from the types) the involvement of subcomputations from a more sensitive family member and, on the other hand, Haskell's types do not identify IO-actions which might throw exceptions. In this light, we need to adapt the implementation of join MAC to rule out Bob's attack.
We redefine join MAC to disallow propagation of exception across family members (Stefan et al. 2012b) . For that, we utilize the same mechanism that jeopardized security: exceptions. Figure 10 presents a revised version of join MAC . It runs the computation m while catching any possible raised exception. Importantly, join MAC returns a value of type Labeled ℓH a even if exceptions are present. In case of abnormal termination, join MAC returns a labeled value which contains an exception-this exception is re-thrown when forcing its evaluation. In the definition of join MAC , function slabel is used instead of label in order to avoid introducing type constraint 
The (Covert) Elephant in the Room
Covert channels are a known limitation for both MAC and IFC systems (Lampson 1973) . Generally speaking, they are no more than unanticipated side-effects capable of transmitting information. Given secure systems, there are surely many covert channels present in one way or another. To defend against them, it is a question of how much effort it takes for an attacker to exploit them and how much bandwidth they provide. In this section, we focus on a covert channel which can be already exploited by untrusted code: non-termination of programs.
EXAMPLE 7. Bob knows that termination of programs is difficult to enforce for many analyses. Inspired by his attack on exceptions, he suspects that some information could be leaked if a computation MAC H loops depending on a secret value. With that in mind, Bob writes the following code.
[String ] dict = filter (λtry → length try 4 ∧ length try 8) (subsequences "0123456789") In a sequential setting, the most effective manner to exploit the termination covert channel is a brute-force attack (Askarov et al. 2008 )-taking exponential time in the size (of bits) of the secret. As the example above shows, such attacks consist of iterating over the domain of secrets and producing an observable output at each iteration until the secret is guessed. We remark that most mainstream IFC compilers and interpreters ignore leaks due to termination, e.g., Jif (Myers et al. 2001 )-based on Java-, FlowCaml (Simonet 2003 )-based on Ocaml-, and JSFlow (Hedin et al. 2014 )-based on JavaScript. In a similar manner, our development of MAC ignores termination for sequential programs. The introduction of concurrency, however, increases the bandwidth of this covert channel to the point where it can no longer be neglected (Stefan et al. 2012a ).
Concurrency
MAC is of little protection against information leaks when concurrency is naively introduced. The mere possibility to run (conceptually) simultaneous MAC ℓ computations provides attackers with new tools to bypass security checks. In particular, freely spawning threads magnifies the bandwidth of the termination covert channel to be linear in the size (of bits) of secrets-as opposed to exponential as in sequential programs 7 . In this section, we focus on providing concurrency while avoiding the termination covert channel. Figure 11 . Secure forking of threads function structurally similar to crashOnTrue , i.e., containing a join MAC block followed by a public event.
MAC ("http://bob.evil/bit=" + + show n + + ";" + + show (¬ try)) return () Function loopOn loops if the secret coincides with its first argument. Otherwise, it sends the value ¬ try to Bob's server. As the next step, Bob takes the attack from Section 4 and modifies function leakBit as follows.
This function spawns two MAC L-threads; one of them is going to loop infinitely, while the other one leaks the secret into Bob's server. As in Section 4, leaking a single bit in this manner leads to compromising any secret with high bandwidth.
What constitutes a leak is the fact that a non-terminating MAC ℓH-action can suppress the execution of subsequently MAC ℓL-events. The reason for the attack is similar to the one presented in Example 5; the difference being that it suppresses subsequent public actions with infinite loops rather than by throwing exceptions. In Example 8, a non-terminating join MAC (see function loopOn) suppresses the execution of wget MAC and therefore the communication with Bob's server-since Bob can detect the absence of network messages, Bob is learning about Alice's secrets! To safely extend the library with concurrency, we force programmers to decouple computations which depend on sensitive data from those performing public side-effects. To achieve that, we replace join MAC by fork MAC as defined in Figure 11 . As a result, non-terminating loops based on secrets cannot affect the outcome of public events. Observe that it is secure to spawn computations from more sensitive family members, i.e., MAC ℓH, because the decision to do so depends on data at level ℓL. Although we remove join MAC , family members can still communicate by sharing secure references. Since references obey to the no read-up and no write-down principles, the communication between threads gets automatically secured. EXAMPLE 9. To secure MAC, Alice replaces her version of function fork MAC with the one in Figure 11 and 
Synchronization Primitives
Synchronization primitives are vital for concurrent programs. In this section, we describe how to extend MAC with MVar s-an established synchronization abstraction in Haskell (Peyton Jones et al. 1996) .
We proceed in a similar manner as we did for references. We consider MVar s as labeled resources, where type synonym MVar MAC ℓ a is defined as Res ℓ (MVar a), see Figure 12 . Secondly, we obtain secure version of functions newEmptyMVar :: IO (MVar a), takeMVar :: MVar a → IO a, and putMVar :: MVar a → a → IO (). Function newEmptyMVar MAC uses new TCB to create a labeled resource based on newEmptyMVarthus, obeying the no write-down rule. Functions takeMVar MAC and putMVar MAC require special attention. The type signature of takeMVar suggests that this operation only performs a read side-effect. However, its semantics performs more than that. Function takeMVar blocks if the content of the MVar is empty, i.e., it reads the MVar to determine if it is empty; otherwise, it atomically fetches the content and empties the MVar , i.e., a write side-effect. From the security stand point, we should account for both effects. With that in mind, we introduce the following auxiliary function.
TCB io r = write TCB (λ → return ()) r > > read TCB io r This function lifts a superfluous write-only IO-action (λ → return ()). The read side-effect is indicated by lifting the action given as an argument, i.e., read TCB io r . The type constraints for wr TCB indicate that operations with read and write effects require labeled resources to have the same security label as the family member under consideration. Function takeMVar MAC is defined as wr TCB takeMVar -see Figure 12 . Dually, function putMVar blocks if the content of the MVar is not empty, i.e., it reads the MVar to see if it is full; otherwise, it atomically writes its argument into the MVar , i.e., a write side-effect. Similar to takeMVar MAC , we should account for both effects. Hence, the superfluous read-only IO-action of the form λ → return ⊥. (It is safe to return ⊥ since subsequent actions will ignore it.) We introduce the following auxiliary function. rw TCB :: (ℓL ⊑ ℓH, ℓH ⊑ ℓL) ⇒ (d a → IO ()) → Res ℓH (d a) → MAC ℓL () rw TCB io r = read TCB (λ → return ⊥) r > > write TCB io r Function putMVar MAC is then defined as shown in Figure 12 . We remark that GHC optimizes away the superfluous IO-actions from wr TCB and rw TCB , i.e., there is no runtime overhead when indicating read or write effects not captured in the interface of an IO-action.
The types for takeMVar MAC and putMVar MAC can be further simplified. The unification of ℓL and ℓH obtains that ℓH ⊑ ℓH (always holds) which makes it possible to remove all the type constraints-we initially described them to show the derivation of security types based on read and write effects.
Final Remarks
MAC is a simple static security library to protect confidentiality in Haskell. The library embraces the no write-up and no read-up rules as its core design principles. We implement a mechanism to safely extend MAC based on these rules, where read and write effects are mapped into security checks. Compared with state-of-the-art IFC compilers or interpreters for other languages, MAC offers a feature-rich static library for protecting confidentiality in just a few lines of code (192 SLOC 8 ). We take this as an evidence that abstractions provided by Haskell, and more generally functional programming, are amenable for tackling modern security challenges. For brevity, and to keep this work focused, we do not cover relevant topics for developing fully-fledged secure applications on top of MAC. However, we briefly describe some of them for interested readers.
Declassification As part of their intended behavior, programs intentionally release private information-an action known as declassification. There exists many different approaches to declassify data (Sabelfeld & Sands 2005) .
Richer label models For simplicity, we consider a two-point security lattice for all of our examples. In more complex applications, confidentiality labels frequently contain a description of the principals (or actors) who own and are allowed to manipulate data (Myers & Liskov 1998; Broberg & Sands 2010) . Recently, Buiras et al. (Buiras et al. 2015) leverage the (newly added) GHC feature closed type families (Eisenberg et al. 2014) to model DC-labels, a label format capable to express the interests of several principals (Stefan et al. 2011a) .
Safe Haskell The correctness of MAC relies on two Haskell's features: type safety and module encapsulation. GHC includes language features and extensions capable to break both features. Safe Haskell (Terei et al. 2012 ) is a GHC extension that identifies a subset of Haskell that subscribes to type safety and module encapsulation. MAC leverages SafeHaskell when compiling untrusted code.
